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Editorial. toward getting some facts less snarled?
Caroline Allison and Reginald Green
On a cloth untrue,
With a twisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
Mistakes are mistakes.
- J. K. Nyerere
Do not go silent
Into that good night,
But rage, rage
Against the dying of the light.
- Dylan Thomas
1979-1985: Confidence Through Concern to
Crisis
IDS has been involved in study, research, teaching and
advising on sub-Saharan African development since
its inception over two decades ago. Some IDS Fellows'
experience in Africa goes back a quarter ola century.
In the late 1970s most IDS members working in Africa
were optimistic. Problems, mistakes and areas of
uncertainty were clear, but the general impression was
one Qf growing knowledge, more and - perhaps -
more equitable development. SSA as a whole had
apparently weathered the 1973-75 global economic
shocks fairly speedily and appeared (as GDP figures
later confirmed) to be doing better over 1976-79 than
in any previous four-year period. Some countries were
exceptions, and in 1979-80 IDS membes tended to see
the signs of an overall reversal of trend in the context
of specific countries. Growing doubts were increased
in the autumn of 1981 by the appearance of the World
Bank's Accelerated Development Report.
1981-1985: The New Conventional Wisdom
The AcceleratedDevelopment Report did not represent
a totally new analysis of SSA nor a new academic
perspective on public economic policy. Its chief
author, Eliot Berg, had been writing similar - indeed
clearer and more purist - analytical and policy
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prescriptions for two decades. The very different
OECD (and especially US and UK) response to the
1979 as opposed to the 1974 international economic
crises already symbolised a change towards the
emergence of a less cautious, more radical, more
market and less public sector/state intervention
oriented mood on public policy generally. What then
was the significance of Accelerated Development?
First, it marked the first widely read and seriously
studied application of the 'new conventional wisdom'
to Africa. Second, it came at a time when the world
climate of policy and - less uniformly - analytical
opinion was already shifting in the directions it
advocated. Third, by 1981 a majority of SSA
economies (whatever their 1976-79 records) were
enmeshed in a very serious economic malaise which
neither holding operations nor 'more of the same'
seemed likely to overcome. Governments, aid agencies
and analysts were faute de mieux in the market for
something new. Fourth, AcceleratedDevelopment had
the reputation, influence and financial clout of the
World Bank behind it, a doubly telling point since it
appeared to be a recantation of key elements
(including modernisation, large-scale, high technology
and 'elimination of mass poverty'/'basic needs') at the
core of the Bank's previous thinking, strategic and
policy advice, and funding on SSA. Fifth, any serious
analyst or reflective decision-taker could easily
identify policy errors made by - or on behalf of
- most SSA countries, especially in implementation
and total unprojected results. These suggested either
faulty analytical tools, imperfect data and/or the
failure to relate analysis to context. The Report
appeared to meld a number of random empirical
snapshots iñto evidence on broader analytical and
strategic issues. To a degree it achieved this, although
at the expense of blurring contextual issues and
diversity still further.
The dialogue touched off by the World Bank Report
has clearly been necessary and in many respects
positive:
the production and distribution record (whether
in terms of incentive or equity efficiency) in
almost all SSA countries since 1979 has been
totally unsatisfactory and the type of adjust-
ment that worked for a majority over 1974-75
has usually failed utterly. New contexts require
new policies, which, in turn, require new
analytical emphases and approaches.
the importance of real incentives - and in
particular of real prices (especially real grower
prices both official and effective, real wages and
real foreign exchange prices) as well as
monetary and price considerations more
generally had been underexamined by much
structuralist analysis. At the policy level, while
SSA governments placed very heavy stress on
prices as policy tools (probably more than in
any other region), they did so inconsistently, on
the basis of imperfect data, with major gaps. In
addition nominal and real prices were frequently
confused.
with falling real resource availability, public
sector programmes, public enterprises and
efforts to redistribute consumption, in parti-
cular, needed to be re-analysed. To attempt to
cut back while doing everything much as before
was clearly likely to be an inefficient 'solution'
by any test. Similarly the clash between the
analysts' (and the aid agencies') concept of a
benign, well informed, civil and participatory,
administratively competent and national
interest oriented (in the Keynesian sense) state
in many SSA countries raised serious questions
as to analytical relevance.
- the stress placed by many SSA governments and
almost all external sources of finance on large-
scale, modern, capital-import-energy intensive
approaches in all sectors (not least agriculture)
had already been questioned by many
structuralist and basic needs oriented analysts.
With changes in relative world prices from 1973
and declines in SSA's earned import capacity,
this strategy increasingly looked to be inefficient
on market criteria, and impossible in structura-
list or general macroeconomic terms.
- few' SSA states, including the large minority
which had actively promoted exports and were
seen as committed to export led growth, had
coherent external balance projections and still
less articulated ways to adjust to these. Nor did
they have coherent strategies and the means to
implement them at sectoral and product level,
whether by price incentives, investment or other
means.
- overall agricultural output in SSA has been
growing less rapidly than population for a
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quarter of a century. Since 1979, with very few
exceptions whatever strategy, investment and
policy packages have been applied, the decline
has accelerated, suggesting a need to rethink all
applied and most analytical approaches.
Certainly natural disasters and a clear secular
fall in rainfall from the mid-l960s contributed.
Increasing inability (by public and private
sectors) to deliver inputs, basic services,
incentive goods, market outlets and prices to
sustain or restructure production to avert the
worsening human impact of drought have,
however, been major factors in this process of
negative development. The decline has des-
cended to the point at which 1985 sees 30 million
people in real danger of starvation with no clear
analytic, strategic or programmatic basis yet in
sight for projecting any early reversal.
- And Its Adjustment
The dialogue has resulted in significant reappraisal of
some of the 'new conventional wisdom's' initial tenets.
That is to be expected: new formulations always have
rough edges. A near universal result of functional
dialogue is partial synthesis, even if this is sometimes
only skin deep.
First, it is now increasingly agreed that unselective
expansion of primary exports is unlikely to lead to
rapid recovery (see Martin Godfrey in this issue) and
that, except in special cases, e.g. Botswana, self
sufficiency in basic food is likely to be efficient in
output, distribution and risk reduction terms. These
points, the first a reversal and the second a
clarification of Accelei'atedDevelopmeni, are apparent
in the Joint Programme ofAction [World Bank 1984].
Second, .4cceleratecl Development's anti-import sub-
stitution thrust has been modified towards a more
analytically consistent position. Efficient import
substitution in food, energy, agricultural inputs, and
(less uniformly) 'incentive', i.e. basic consumer goods,
has now been added as the counterpart of efficient
export promotion in the 'new conventional wisdom'
(an area to which Manfred Bienefeld's article on
industry is relevant).
Third, having established the importance of price, the
mainstream within the 'new conventional wisdom' has
become much readier to accept that, however
necessary, getting the prices right requires parallel
sectoral and micro policies on the physical side if it is
to make lasting changes on real relative prices or
output. Michael Lipton's article argues this in respect
to agricultural research and its relationship to
agricultural policy success, Equally the costs, even in
narrow economic terms, of radical adjustments to
relative prices, especially in a context of overall falls in
real resources per capita, are seen as high, i.e. price
instruments are not cheap and easy to use. Often these
are so high, as to render them unusable or
unsustainable without supporting injections of real
resources to cover the period before output can
respond.
Fourth, while clearly still of the view that in general
public enterprises are less efficient than private and
that state services and policy were overextended, there
has been a shift toward noting diversity of experience;
accepting that wholesale privatisation poses its own
problems, not least in rural health and education; and
seeking to achieve tighter priorities and more efficient
use of available resources within the public sector
rather than dismantling it wholesale.'
Fifth, at least some contributions (e.g. by the World
Bank) to the 'new conventional wisdom' have recently
reaffirmed that the economic malaise in sub-Saharan
Africa should be seen primarily as a human tragedy
and that the limitations of price centred policies have
particularly serious negative implications for the
absolutely poor. This is especially true for the poorest
peasants who produce primarily food and housing for
their own use. Major constraints to their short or long
term productivity are posed by lack of access to basic
education, health and pure water facilities. The
general attack on redistribution has been refocused to
advocate, if not yet articulate, more cost efficient
approaches to achieving universal access to basic
services (seen as production efficient) and to devising
ways of increasing output relevant to the peasant
household head, whose immediate challenge is to
produce enough for his or her family to eat.
Internal Versus External Orientation:
Who Was Right?
In one sense both the pre-1979 advocates of
structuralist internal market orientation and export
led growth have been 'proven' correct. SSA's post
1979 economic malaise has been gravely aggravated by
the import intensity of national economies and by lack
of effective action to maintain production of
agricultural and agricultural input/incentive goods.
But, the import strangulation confronting half the
SSA economies is in large measure the result of
In fact the 'new conventional wisdom' has not been consistent on
price Intervention (i.e. market management). tt has urged major
government intervention in respect to grower prices, foreign
exchange prices and interest rates in order to raise them and on wage
(and less uniformly) salary rates to hold them down nominally and
cut them in real terms. lt is not, in particular cases, by any means
evident that the advice given (however sensible) bore a close relation
to what any actual market process freed from state management
would have produced.
sluggish export growth which was not balanced by
reductions in import dependence, at least in certain
key sectors. As a result, high export (more specifically
import capacity) growth economies like Botswana and
the Cameroon have been better able to weather
external shocks, to stabilise and to maintain growth
rates of GDP significantly above population.
In another sense both schools seem to have been
proven wrong. It has been demonstrated that national
(or regional) economic integration requires absolute
increases in imports. A halfway house with moderate
- but still unsubstitutable - import dependence
causes a negative GDP multiplier of up to five to one
for import cuts. The case for disregarding exports as a
route to strengthening domestic oriented production
appears to be fallacious. On the other hand, even for
most export oriented economies, it has been
impossible to maintain adequate export growth to
overcome terms of trade deterioration, weather and
other shocks, and to maintain balance. Zambia - an
above average if uneven performer in the 1960s and
early 1970s - has since faced ever deepening balance
and structural problems with no early resolution in
sight, as Philip Daniel's article in this Bulletin shows.
Botswana's export led development - very rapid
from a very low base - is about to come under severe
strain. Unless a major new mine can be developed
before 1990; a breakthrough in irrigated agriculture
achieved by the same time; or the recent boom in
non-traditional exports continues at the same rate (i.e.
requiring much larger absolute increases) for the next
five years, the 1990s are likely to be a period of severe
strains on balance and low growth (see Charles
Harvey's article in this Bulletin).
Has IDS Changed Its Position
IDS members, apart from being very far from
monolithic, have tended to be in the middle (and under
fire from several sides) on many of these issues (see, for
example, Sender and Smith 1983). Many of the
emphases in IDS work on SSA have changed, partly
because most members tend to concentrate on issues
and areas of analysis they feel have been understressed,
and on operational and policy issues they believe are in
danger of being overlooked or misinterpreted. Given
the changes in SSA, within individual SSA states, in the
world economy and in the nature of the analytical
dialogue and policy debate on SSA since 1979, it
would be surprising if this were not the case. Thus how
much of the change is related to perception of altered
reality, how much to additional data and how much to
altered basic views or interpretations is unclear.
Doubtless each is significant and varies between
members.
Three themes have, however, remained central in IDS
work on SSA. The first is complexity: the danger that
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highly simplified analysis and policy will be both
incomplete and inappropriate - a theme running
through several articles in this Bulletin, notably those
by Caroline Allison, Christopher Coiclough and
Martin Godfrey. The second is diversity: the need to
recognise that SSA economic contexts, structures,
policies and performance vary sharply from country
to country, illustrated in the articles by Philip Daniel,
Charles Harvey and Reginald Green. The third is
interaction: that different strands of analysis and
policy have a different significance when taken
together rather than in isolation - one aspect of the
articles by Manfred Bienefeld, Michael Lipton and
Hans Singer.
The present Bulletin is part of a continuing process of
exploration, rethinking and reformulation.2 Its key
objective is to contribute to the pressing task of getting
some facts straight as a precondition for applied
analysis in complex contexts.
The first three articles in this issue centre on some of
the underlying factors and urgent concerns in respect
to agriculture and food production. Hans Singer's
article conveys growing concern about the way in
which emergencies have been handled, and explores
some practical ways both to improve responses and
avert future crises. Michael Lipton seeks to explain the
paradox which surrounds high levels of expenditure
on agricultural research and notoriously slow growth
in agricultural production. Caroline Allison focuses
on three major issues of crucial significance to women
in their roles as major food producers which have
tended towards ambiguity in analyses of rural political
economy.
The remaining contributions to this Bulletin look at
two questions from various perspectives. First, the
need to reassess elements of the old and new
'conventional wisdom' in the light of contemporary
developments. Second, the ways .n which stabilisation
has, or has not, been achieved in specific contexts and
how it might be approached more generally.
Christopher Colclough questions the effectiveness of
price reform in eliciting desired changes in production
and distribution in the light of recent debates. He
focuses in particular on the issues of domestic
taxation, nominal exchange rates and inflation,
pointing to the lack of evidence upon which analysis
has been built within what are held to be competing
paradigms.
Martin Godfrey reassesses the debate surrounding
three of the Accelerated Development Report's policy
2 Three of the articles in this issue are revisions of longer papers
prepared for the Conference on Rehabilitation and Recovery in
sub-Saharan Africa' held in Paris August 1984, co-sponsored by
OECD Development Centre, IDS and CERDI.
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prescriptions in the context of recent challenges to
these. He finds the universal recommendation to
increase agricultural exports guilty of the 'fallacy of
composition', and postulates food self-sufficiency as
the safest basis for food security. He concludes that
dogmatic views about devaluation are unwarranted
on the basis of country-specific experience in SSA.
One of the two country case-studies, by Charles
Harvey, looks at Botswana's national adjustment
strategy adopted on government initiative to meet
growing balance of payments difficulties. Despite the
success of this strategy and its similarity in form to the
conventional IMF adjustment package, he stresses
that the causes of imbalance in Botswana and the
context in which adjustment was undertaken are such
as to preclude this case being used as a blueprint of
action for the region. The second article, by Philip
Daniel, analyses Zambia's inability to withstand
economic shocks despite enduring attempts at
stabilisation, and concludes that the reasons for this
are less straightforward than often believed.
The starting point of Reginald Green's article is the
diversity of result revealed by Botswana, Zambia and
Zimbabwe in their stabilisation efforts. This questions
the use and appropriateness of IMF resources in
economies where recovery of import capacity from
exports is dubious on technical grounds. He
emphasises timing, phasing, sequencing and selectivity
if the goal of stabilisation with adjustment is to be
achieved.
The last article, by Manfred Bienefeld, suggests that
the 'new consensus' on industrialisation is simply the
'old approach' dressed in new rhetoric, and reasserts
the need for the former to incorporate some of the
basic tenets laid down by the dependency school,
broadly defined, whose somewhat bleak prognosis has
been validated. He argues that this is necessary not
only to understand the 'failure' of industrialisation,
but to learn from it and challenge negative
developments in the future.
Toward a Consensus of Analysis?
There is reason to believe that the dialogue on SSA is
becoming less heated, rigid and controversial and
more exploratory, synthesis building and orientated to
African results, at least among some analysts. In terms
of clusters of priority actions (if not equally among
their relative weights and sequential logic) there is
relatively broad agreement among analysts who have
historically been viewed as adherents of very divergent
paradigms and strategies, although major areas of
disagreement persist.
As suggested above, many of the themes of the 'new
conventional wisdom' clearly needed to be incor-
porated into both the analytically dominant (if
marginal in most policy determining circles) structura-
list approaches and operationally dominant (if
analytically little supported) modernisation approach.
Similarly many of the concerns of the main body of
structuralist analysis have proven to be logical missing
links in the new conventional wisdom', especially at
the level of operational use. It is not much use
querying who has moved further - most analysts tend
to overestimate how much others have shifted towards
them and to underestimate their own shifts.
However, this emergence of semi-consensus - or at
any rate reasonably polite, mutually intelligible
discourse - should not be allowed to obscure four
points:
First, agreement is much greater in respect to the short
than the long run and to rehabilitation and recovery
than to development. Differences of emphasis in the
short run often widen into basic differences of
analysis, judgement or value system.
Second, if there is an agreement on detailed applied
analysis it is that simple, universal answers at the
operational level are frequently not available, that all
of us know less (as well as more) about SSA than we
thought we did five or ten years ago.
Third, in many sectors and contexts the basic data for
serious and accurate analysis do not exist, so that
articulation between broadly postulated principles
and specific cases is very hard, and gives rise to
surprising results.
Fourth, increasing consensus at the analytical level is
not equally as evident at the policy level, either in SSA
or globally.
And of Policy-Makers?
That policies have changed in and with respect to SSA
is self evident. Given the falls in real command over
resources within SSA, the collapse of credit ratings for
almost all SSA states and the radically more market
oriented and resource cutting climate of global
economic policy, this is inevitable.
Some changes are fairly standard among both external
sources of finance and SSA governments. First, a
growing sense of horror and - less uniformly - of
weariness at apparently falling back no matter how
fast one runs. Second, a deepening realisation that
recovery will neither be the automatic result of global
recovery nor quick. Third, very heavy emphasis on
nominal prices (in effect if not always in intent) and on
exports, again less uniformly, especially in acute food
crises and among some bilateral agencies. Fourth, a
fairly clear (if sometimes suppressed) concern that a
satisfactory strategy for the medium and long term
cannot be discerned. Fifth, a greater emphasis on
efficiency (often not very clearly defined as efficiency
for what or for whom), partly because of a belief that
adequate resources will not, in fact, be available.
Sixth, a great deal of certainty about bits and pieces of
policies and programmes - a certainty which is not
always very convincingly linked to the quality or
consistency of past advice/decisions, to available data
or to coherent analysis. Seventh, a growing (and
unwelcome) realisation that further demand cuts (bar
those resulting from greater output for lower input)
are in many cases likely to prove counterproductive in
relation to exports and future consumption.
These common elements do not, however, add up to
consensus, nor in many cases to policies which are
consistent with each other, with the so-called emergent
analytical consensus or with any very high probability
of success. Most bilateral and international aid/
development agencies as of 1985 appear, at the
operational level, to be lagging behind the analytical
dialogue (including in some cases their own analysts'),
adopting elements of the 1981 'new conventional
wisdom' that have not worn well and rejecting
elements of their own past programmes which are now
being more positively reassessed.
Among SSA governments there is substantial
divergence. Most are in practice engaged in crisis
containment and damage limitation because they lack
the resources or the articulated strategic base to do
anything else. A few (e.g. Ivory Coast) stilloperate on
the assumption that cyclical recovery is around the
next corner, and another handful (e.g. Nigeria) on
draconic cutbacks. In strong economies with firm
export bases this may work. Only a minority have
either avoided or surmounted crisis (e.g. Cameroon,
Botswana) and even these are rather cautious or
perplexed as to their medium term prospects. The
number with functioning stabilisation/structural
adjustment programmes that are likely to survive is
arguable. That Ghana and Uganda (and - until
recently - the Sudan) are often cited indicates how
problematic this category is.
Bilateral and international development agencies are,
surprisingly, given the effects of much past advice
which has been acted on, very confident both at micro
and at broad policy level that they know what Africa
should do. Certainly much of their advice is new
(though not by any means all - primary export
expansion is a theme that dates back at least 65 years)
or represents a significant shift in emphasis. The
confident assumption that it is all correct, contextually
relevant, practically operational and better for having
little African involvement, is not new. In many
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respects it is as contrary to the advice of some 'new
conventional wisdom' analysts - and indeed some
agency analysts - as it is to that of many structuralist
or basic needs analysts. Moreover, the agencies are to
date unable to provide the resources which their own
projections suggest are necessary for people to live, for
economies to hold together, and for states to survive
until new policies and allocations can bear fruit in
production. This, in practice, forces down time and
resource horizons and leads back to damage
containment more often than to structural adjustment,
however defined.3
Some Conundrums for Analysts and
Practitioners
With analytical dialogue less antagonistic and
operational exploration showing the problems that
data gaps pose to the implementation of new
approaches, opportunity exists for identifying and
acting on key areas of data collection and
interpretation.4 A series of conundrums exists.
First, many correlations are weak, go in the wrong
direction or are somewhat less than clear in causal
direction. For example, correlations over time
between actual consumer and official grower prices
are rather low. So too are those between grower price
movements and overall agricultural output trends.
Similarly the correlation between rates of increase in
actual consumer (and probable effective grower5) food
prices and rate of growth of food production appears
to be negative.6 While overvalued exchange rates
clearly do contribute to external imbalance, the initial
direction of causation in several cases appears to be
Alternatively il might lead to concentrating on a selected minority
of states - selected for reasons such as tractability, past economic
performance, recent policy changes and/or political durability.
These might then receive adequate resources. Certainly a look at
World Bank fund availabilities and its estimates of inputs needed
for structural adjustment programmes suggest it would be hard put
to support SAPs in more than a quarter ofSSA member states even
if it were totally satisfid with their proposals. Apart from human
considerations, such rico-triage as a policy would increase
disagreement among donors (perceptions vary wideiy among them
on the selectability of particular SSA states) and would pose
political problems for them at home. Disaster does raise popular
demand for increased aid independent of state policy and
performance levels.
The Paris Conference agreed on over 20 priority clusters which will
be presented in the forthcoming volume: Crisi.s and Recovery in
sub-Saharan Africa: Realities and Complexities, (OECD, Paris).
- Low grower food (as opposed to export crop) prices tend to change
the marketing channels used more than output. In few African
countries does even 50 per cent of commercially marketed food pass
through official or even large scale, recórded private channels. In
many it is as tow as 10 per cent whether because of the absence of
such bodies or their evasion by growers.
In one sense this is perfectly predictable. However, il does raise
serious questions as to the responsiveness of supply to price
incentives without complementary measures.
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increases in external imbalance caused by shock
leading to overvaluation, not the reverse. These are
examples which urgently demand better checking of
fairly fragmentary and weak data, and subsequent
attempts at more contextual analysis.
Second, it is increasingly clear that the crisis in
agricultural production dates back 25 years, not to
1979 or even 1969. It eroded the ability of most SSA
economies to respond to post 1979 shocks and has
been exacerbated by that inability to respond. It is,
however, a separate malaise which recovery in other
sectors and economic balances alone is unlikely to
cure. As already noted, rises in food prices faster than
the Consumer Price Index (true of almost all of Africa
since 1979 and common from 1960 on) have not been
enough to reverse this pattern. Clearly more study is
needed. In the short run more food aid is vital, but
preferably within a context in which (unlike the record
in the Sahel) it lays a foundation for averting, not
increasing future food aid needs - themes discussed
in Hans Singer's article. Another strand is serious
examination of what the African farmer does, knows,
wants and could and would do in different contexts.
Women have received little attention, although it is
their actions - or inactions - which largely
determine whether food production strategies and
policies succeed or fail - an area explored here by
Caroline Allison. In addition, the previously unfash-
ionable view that knowledge on how to raise output in
safe, tested ways which can be used by peasant
farmers, was very scarce in Africa so that research
(and improvement in its cost effectiveness) was critical
to agricultural analysis, and policy has been gaining
support. This is exemplified by Michael Lipton's
article in this collection.
These by no means exhaust the data gaps and
interpretational conundrums as illustrated in this
Bulletin by the triad of articles on the requirements of
and interrelationships among stabilisation and
structural adjustment under different conditions. But
given the present quasi consensus and ongoing
dialogue anong analysts, they do illustrate the need to
build a firmer data base, including more sectoral and
comparative work. Straight facts are a precondition
for straight applied analysis - especially in complex
contexts. Their paucity in SSA calls for structural
adjustment almost as much as does the paucity of
exports and is, perhaps, one in which analysts have a
greater direct comparative advantage in production.
Economic Malaise: Human Tragedy
It is all too easy in analysis, dialogue and prescription
to abstract from what the economic malaise in sub-
Saharan Africa means to the population of the region.
In that respect the grim panorama of famine flashing
across television screens since the second half of 1984
may be as important to analysts, advisers and
technocrats, who are at one level well acquainted with
the realities of SSA, as to ordinary viewers and
decision-takers who had previously paid them little
attention.
The root causes of this human tragedy are general
economic - and especially agricultural - failure,
exacerbated by the politics of food. Of the 30 million at
risk of starvation in 1984-85 probably at least
one million women, infants, men and children died
between 1984 and 1985 who would not have done so
had adequate domestic food production, adequate
export earnings to finance food imports or adequate
food aid been available.
Starvation is only the most evident cause of death
directly resulting from economic malaise. Others
include: national child immunisation and vaccination
programmes cut by import strangulation in respect to
vaccines and fuel; inadequate supplies of safe drinking
water; and the spread of contagious, poverty related
diseases.
Many traditional nOter sources should not be used for human consumption.
Death is only the last stage of immiserisation. Declines
of 50 per cent or more in real consuming power of
salaries, of minimum wages, of informal sector urban
incomes, of purchasing power of export crops and of
basic output of food to eat in 'moderately' drought
impacted areas cannot easily be brushed aside.
The human costs of breakdowns in once reasonably
well functioning basic health, education and water
services are equally appalling. Ask the woman who
has to walk 12 miles a day because the village pump
cannot be used as a result of import constraints on
fuel, spares or the mobility of the repair technician.
Perhaps even more dangerous - not least from the
point of view of future production responses to any
policies and incentives - is a growing sense of
hopelessness. Six to 25 years of economic failure or
damage limitation and loss of what once had been
attained, immiserises morally and spiritually as well as
materially. For IDS members, the erosion of hope,
morale and self-confidence among their SSA friends
has been one of the most painful signs of the continued
evolution of economic malaise.
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It is false to see the human dimension as in conflict
with analytical or policy aspects. True production
oriented policies that pay no attention to shielding
poor and vulnerable groups are in real danger of
producing repeated and wide-scale disaster in
countries as poor as many in SSA. But it is precisely
because so many Africans and so many African
economies are poor that production is a vital goal.
With so few resources available, inefficiency in using
them to achieve priority targets has very serious
consequences.
For the concerned analyst of SSA today a prime
responsibility is to get more facts straight. Knowing
what has and is happening, and why, is basic to doing
something about it. Trial and error is, at least in SSA
today, an expensive way forward, not just in terms of
production but in terms of human lives.
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